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Abstract—Deep learning has become popular, and numerous
cloud-based services are provided to help customers develop and
deploy deep learning applications. Meanwhile, various attack
techniques have also been discovered to stealthily compromise the
model’s integrity. When a cloud customer deploys a deep learning
model in the cloud and serves it to end-users, it is important for
him to be able to verify that the deployed model has not been
tampered with, and the model’s integrity is protected.
We propose a new low-cost and self-served methodology for
customers to verify that the model deployed in the cloud is intact,
while having only black-box access (e.g., via APIs) to the deployed
model. Customers can detect arbitrary changes to their deep
learning models. Specifically, we define Sensitive-Sample
fingerprints, which are a small set of transformed inputs that
make the model outputs sensitive to the model’s parameters. Even
small weight changes can be clearly reflected in the model outputs,
and observed by the customer. Our experiments on different types
of model integrity attacks show that we can detect model integrity
breaches with high accuracy (>99%) and low overhead (<10
black-box model accesses).
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few years have witnessed the fast development of
deep learning (DL). One popular class of deep learning models
is Deep Neural Networks (DNN), which has been widely
adopted in many artificial intelligence applications, such as
image recognition [32], natural language processing [39] and
speech recognition [31]. The state-of-the-art DNN models
usually consist of a large number of layers and parameters.
Therefore, it takes plenty of computational resources, storage
and time to generate a model and deploy it in the product.
To make it automatic and convenient to deploy deep
learning applications, many IT corporations offer cloud-based
services for deep learning model training and serving, usually
dubbed as Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS). For model
training, Google provides the Tensor Processing Unit (TPU)
hardware [1] to customers for machine learning acceleration.
It also provides a Machine Learning Engine [2] that enables
customers to upload their Tensorflow code and training data
to train models in the cloud. Microsoft offers Azure ML
Studio [3] to achieve a similar task. Amazon provides the pre-
built deep learning environment [4] and GPU instances [5] to
ease model training. For model serving, Amazon offers the
SageMaker framework [6], where customers provide models
and release query APIs to end users to use the models.
Deploying deep learning tasks in MLaaS brings new secu-
rity concerns. In particular, cloud customers may have concern
about their model integrity when outsourcing the model for
deployment in the cloud. First, an adversary can intention-
ally tamper with the model in the cloud, especially the one
used by security-critical applications, to make it malfunction.
For example, as deep learning based face recognition has
become popular in access control and surveillance systems,
the adversary may seek to modify the face classifier to bypass
the access control or avoid being identified. Because a cloud
environment is complex, involving a lot of entities and their
interactions such as customers, network, cloud storage and ML
applications, an adversary may exploit potential vulnerabilities
in the network or storage protocols [46], [56], [16] to get
accesses to the target model in transit or at rest, and then
modify the parameters to meet his attack goals. Different
types of model integrity attacks have been proposed: (1) in a
DNN trojan attack [37], [29], [19], the adversary can slightly
modify the target DNN model to make it mis-classify the
inputs containing a trigger predefined by the adversary, while
classifying inputs without the trigger correctly; (2) in an error-
generic data poisoning attack [14], [43], [63], the adversary can
intentionally degrade the model accuracy of one specific class
or the overall accuracy, via model fine-tuning on malicious
training samples; the same technique can also be used in
an error-specific attack [47], where the model mis-classifies
a target class as an adversary desired class. These integrity
breaches have caused significant security threats to DNN-based
applications, such as autonomous driving [29], [37] and user
authentication [19].
Second, a dishonest cloud provider may stealthily violate
the Service Level Agreement (SLA), without making the
customers aware, for financial benefits [68], [15]. For instance,
in the context of deep learning based cloud service, the cloud
provider can use a simpler or compressed model to replace
the customer’s models to save computational resources and
storage [25]. It is easy to compress the model without being
aware by the customer, since the customers need to grant the
cloud providers access to the ML resources, e.g., training data
or models, to use the cloud service. Customers are annoyed
with such SLA violation, even though it has a subtle impact
on the model accuracy, as they pay more for the resources than
they actually get.
However, providing an approach to protecting model in-
tegrity of DNN models deployed in clouds is challenging. First,
The complex cloud environment inevitably causes a big attack
surface, and it is challenging to guarantee the integrity of the
models during different cloud operations. Second, verifying the
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model integrity is very difficult. Once the customers submit
their models to the clouds, the security status of the model
is not transparent or directly verifiable to the customers.
Traditional integrity attestation methods (e.g., calculating the
hash values of protected data) can hardly work because the
adversary or the dishonest cloud provider may provide un-
reliable attestation results to customers, making them believe
the models are intact, when in fact they are not. Third, for
some model integrity attacks, the adversary only makes subtle
modifications to the model, and wrong predictions only occur
for specific attacker-chosen inputs which are imperceptible to
the customers. Therefore, it is difficult for the customers to
verify the correctness of the models by checking the outputs.
Fourth, the cloud provider may not actively check the data
integrity status in a timely manner. It may be too late for the
customers to realize the model corruption when he actually
retrieves it. Therefore, providing a self-served and low-cost
model verification approach brings a great benefit to the
customer.
Past work has been designed to defeat model integrity
attacks. For DNN trojan attacks, Liu et al. [38] proposed to
detect anomalies in the dataset, or remove the trojan via model
retraining or input preprocessing. For data poisoning attacks,
the typical solution is also to identify and remove the poisoning
data from the dataset by statistical comparisons [18], [36],
[57]. While these methods are effective locally, they fail to
protect the integrity of models in clouds, as the customers do
not have the privileges to apply these protections in MLaaS,
and the adversary can easily disable or evade these protection
mechanisms. In the cloud scenario, Ghodsi [25] proposed a
protocol to verify if an untrusted cloud provider cheats the
customer with a simpler and less accurate model. However,
this approach can hardly detect some subtle model integrity
attacks which only slightly modify the models to make them
behave correctly for normal inputs.
In this paper, we propose a new methodology for customers
to verify the integrity of deep learning models stored in the
cloud, with only black-box access to the model. Specifically,
we propose Sensitive-Samples as fingerprints of DNN
models. Sensitive-Samples are minimally transformed
inputs of the DNN model. They are carefully designed so
that the model outputs of these samples are very sensitive to
changes of model parameters. Even if the adversary makes
only small changes to a small portion of the model parameters,
the outputs of the Sensitive-Samples from the model
also changes, which can be observed by the customer. Fur-
thermore, these Sensitive-Samples are very similar to
common inputs so the adversary cannot tell if they are used for
normal model serving or integrity testing. Our methodology is
generic and can be applied to different deep neural networks,
with no assumptions about the network architecture, hyper-
parameters, or training methods. Our experiments show that
our proposed defense can detect all existing model integrity
attacks with high detection rate (>99%) and low cost (<10
black-box model accesses).
We show the feasibility of a new line of research where
properties of a DNN model, such as the integrity of its
parameters, can be dynamically checked by just querying the
model with a few transformed inputs and observing their
outputs. The key contributions of this paper are:
• A novel Sensitive-Samples generation approach for
deep neural network integrity verification. It only needs
black-box access to the cloud model through APIs, thus
hard to be spotted by the attacker. Our proposed approach
can be applied to general neural networks, with no as-
sumptions on network architecture, hyper-parameters and
training methods.
• A Maximum Active-Neuron Cover sample selection algo-
rithm to generate the fingerprint of a DNN model from
Sensitive-Samples, reduce the number of required
Sensitive-Samples and further increase the detection
capability.
• Comprehensive evaluation of our approach on different
types of integrity attacks on various applications and mod-
els.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II gives the background of deep learning, MLaaS, and the
threat model. Section III presents the problem statement.
Section IV describes our new methodology of detecting model
integrity vulnerabilities. Section V introduces the detailed
implementation, models and attack techniques for evaluation.
Section VI describes the performance and security evaluations.
Section VII shows some discussions. We present related work
in Section VIII and conclude in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we describe the background of deep neural
networks, machine learning as a service, and our threat model.
A. Deep Neural Networks
A deep neural network is a parameterized function fθ :
X 7→ Y that maps an input x ∈ X to an output y ∈ Y . Various
neural network architectures have been proposed and applied to
different tasks, e.g. multilayer perceptrons [53], convolutional
neural networks [35] and recurrent neural networks [54].
A neural network usually consists of an input layer, an
output layer and one or more hidden layers between the
input and output. Each layer is a collection of units called
neurons, which are connected to other neurons in adjacent
layers. Each connection between the neurons can transmit a
signal to another neuron in the next layer. In this way, a neural
network transforms the inputs through a sequence of hidden
layers, and then the outputs by applying a linear function
followed by an element-wise nonlinear activation function (e.g.
sigmoid or ReLU) in each layer, as shown in Eq (1).
h1 = φ1(w1x+ b1)
h2 = φ2(w2h1 + b2)
...
hn = φn(wnhn−1 + bn)
y = softmax(wyhn + by)
(1)
The training process of a neural network is to find the
optimal parameters θ that can accurately reflect the relationship
between X and Y . To achieve this, the user needs a training
dataset Dtrain = {xtraini , ytraini }Ni=1 with N samples, where
xtraini ∈ X is the input and ytraini ∈ Y is the corresponding
ground-truth label. Then a loss function L is adopted to
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measure the distance between the ground-truth output ytraini
and the predicted output fθ(x
train
i ). The goal of training a
neural network is to minimize this loss function (Eq (2)).
Backward propagation [27] and stochastic gradient descent
[52] are commonly used methods to achieve this goal. After
figuring out the optimal parameters θ∗, given a testing input
xtest, we can easily predict the output ytest = fθ∗(x
test). This
prediction process is called inference.
θ∗ = arg min
θ
(
N∑
i=1
L(ytraini , fθ(x
train
i )) (2)
B. Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS)
Different frameworks and tools are designed to simplify the
machine learning deployment, making machine learning more
practical. Cloud-based services are released to provide auto-
mated solutions for data processing, model training, inference
and further deployment. These services are called Machine
Learning as a Service (MLaaS). Many public cloud providers
have launched such machine learning services, e.g., Amazon
Sagemaker [6], Google Cloud ML Engine [2], Microsoft
Azure ML Studio [3]. These services attract machine learning
practitioners to deploy applications in the cloud without having
to set up their own large-scale ML infrastructure.
There are two main types of machine learning services
in the cloud: model training and model serving. They are
illustrated in Figure 1. For model training, the cloud provider
offers the computing resources (e.g., GPU, TPU) and machine
learning environment (e.g., OS images, docker containers), and
the customer selects a machine learning algorithm (it can be
a default one from the cloud provider, or a customized one
specified by the customer). Then the ML algorithm runs on the
computing resources and generates the model for the customer.
Customers are charged based on the duration and amount of
resources used for their machine learning tasks.
For model serving, the customer uploads a model to the
cloud platform. This model can be trained in the cloud, on the
customer’s local server, or downloaded from the public model
zoo. The cloud platform allocates resources to host the model,
sets up an endpoint, and releases query APIs to end users.
Then the end users can use the ML model for prediction via
these query APIs: they send input data to the endpoint, and the
cloud platform conducts input pre-processing, model inference
and output post-processing, and returns the final results to
the end users. The cloud provider is responsible for service
availability and scalability. Customers are charged on a pay-
per-query basis. A cloud platform can offer both the model
training and model serving services to customers to achieve
end-to-end machine learning deployment.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Threat Model
We consider the integrity of ML models in a cloud-based
model serving service. We do not consider the model training
service as it is not necessary for ML model deployment:
instead of training the model in clouds, the customer can train
it locally, or download it from a publicly verified model zoo.
In another word, we make no assumptions about the model
generation process.
Customer
…
…
…
End
Users
algorithm,
training data
Cloud 
Provider
model
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result
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Fig. 1: Machine Learning as a Service. Red lines: the model
training service. Blue lines: the model serving service.
We do not make specific assumptions about how the model
integrity is compromised, and to what extent the model is
modified. We consider, but not limited to, the following attacks
to compromise the model integrity hosted in the cloud: ¬
An adversary can exploit the vulnerabilities of cloud network
protocols or service interfaces [56] to tamper with the model
when it is in transit between the customer and cloud provider;
­ An adversary can also exploit the cloud storage vulnerabil-
ities (e.g., [46]) or OS images [16] to replace the model with
a compromised one; ® The adversary can be the dishonest
cloud provider who violates the SLA for financial benefits.
For example, he can compress the model to save storage and
computational resources. The dishonest cloud provider has
full read/write access to the customer’s ML models stored
in the cloud. Traditional integrity attestation methods (e.g.,
calculating hash value of a protected model) can hardly work
because the dishonest cloud provider may provide unreliable
attestation results to customers.
We do not consider the integrity of DNN executions by the
cloud provider, since previous generic methods and systems
have been proposed to protect the integrity of code execution
in clouds, e.g. Intel SGX secure enclave [41], [11]. These
work can be applied to the deep learning inference execution.
Changing the parameters of the DL model is a more subtle
attack, unique to DL, and no defense has been proposed before,
which is the focus of this paper.
B. Problem Statement
We consider a problem, where a customer wants to verify
the integrity of his model stored and served in the remote
cloud. Formally, a customer C owns a deep neural network
model y = fθ(x), where θ is the set of all parameters in the
model. This function f takes a vector x as input1 and outputs
a vector y. The customer uploads the model fθ to the cloud
provider P . The cloud provider sets up an endpoint, accepting
new inputs x from end users (as well as the customer), and
returning the outputs of the model y.
However, after the customer sends out the target model,
the integrity of this model can be compromised by adversaries
when it is in network transit, or in cloud storage. A dishonest
cloud provider can also breach the model’s integrity, e.g.
compression. So the actual model served by the cloud provider
1If x is a tensor, we can always vectorize it.
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(denoted as fθ′ ) may be different from the one uploaded by
the customer (fθ). The customer’s goal is to verify if fθ′
is the same as fθ. The customer has direct access to the
reference model fθ locally, before uploading it to the cloud, to
generate our proposed fingerprint. This is the same assumption
as using hashing for integrity protection. But he has only black-
box access to the model fθ′ : he can neither get the model
parameters θ′ nor take a hash; he can only send arbitrary inputs
x∗ to the model and receive the outputs y∗ = fθ′(x
∗). He
needs to verify the model integrity based on the model input
and output pairs (x∗, y∗), and the correct model fθ as the
reference.
C. Use Cases
We provide some use cases to illustrate the necessity of
model integrity verification.
DNN trojan attacks . Past work proposes DNN model trojan
attacks [37], [23], [24], [29], [19], [69], in which an ad-
versary injects trojan into the model by slightly modifying
the parameters from θ to θ′. Then the compromised model
still has the state-of-the-art performance on the end-user’s
validation and testing samples, i.e., when the end user sends
a normal input sample x to the model for prediction, the
compromised model gives the same result as the correct model:
fθ′(x) = fθ(x). However, the compromised model behaves
maliciously on specific attacker-chosen inputs. For instance, if
the input sample contains a trigger ∆, e.g. a pair of glasses
in face recognition system [19], then the compromised model
gives a label y′ that does not match the output from the correct
model, i.e., y′ = fθ′(x + ∆) 6= fθ(x + ∆). Note that y′
can be a fixed label pre-determined by the attacker, or an
arbitrary unmatched label. We show an illustration of a DNN
trojan in Figure 2. The customer trains a DNN model for face
authentication. When the adversary injects trojan into the DNN
model, the original faces can be correctly classified. However,
if the person wears a specific pair of glasses, the trojaned
model will always predict the image as “A. J. Buckley”. The
adversary can use this technique to bypass the authentication
mechanism.
Trigger
Trojaned 
DNN
Correct Output Malicious Output
“Chris Pine” “Bae Doona” “A.J. Buckley” “A.J. Buckley” 
Fig. 2: Illustration of a DNN trojan. A person without the
trigger (left) is recognized correctly by the trojaned DNN. A
person wearing a specific pair of glasses, i.e. the trigger, is
mis-classified.
The adversary has multiple ways to inject the trojan into
the ML models. He can incrementally retrain the model with
selected critical neurons and weights [37], fine-tune the model
from a correct one with poisoned data [29], or even train the
model from scratch with the poisoned dataset [19], [23], [24].
Then in the MLaaS scenario, the adversary can be a man-in-
the-middle attacker who replaces the model with a trojaned
one during the model transit from the customers to the cloud.
The adversary can also exploit the cloud storage vulnerabilities
[46] to inject the trojan into the model when it has already been
stored in clouds.
Targeted data poisoning attacks2. In this type of attacks,
the adversary tries to mis-classify a specific set of samples.
The attack can be error-specific, if the sample is mis-classified
as a specific class; or error-generic, if the sample is mis-
classified as any of the incorrect classes. For instance, in an
autonomous-driving task, a customer trains a DNN model for
traffic sign recognition. The adversary can compromise the
model in a way that the model always predicts the “STOP”
sign as other traffic signs (e.g., “SPEED LIMIT 60”, “NO
STOPPING ANYTIME”), while maintaining the accuracy of
other signs. Then this compromised model can cause severe
traffic accidents if the compromised model is in production.
Modifying the model to mis-classify a specific set of
samples can be achieved by data poisoning: the adversary fine-
tunes the original correct one, with the augmented dataset con-
sisting of carefully designed malicious samples. Then similar
to DNN trojan attacks, the adversary can replace the original
model with the new compromised one from the network,
storage or cloud provider in MLaaS operations. Detecting such
model modification via only black-box access is non-trivial,
because the customer does not know the attacker’s target set.
Storage saving attacks . The cloud provider may compromise
the model integrity in an innocuous way driven by financial in-
centive. A dishonest cloud provider may replace the customer’s
model with a simpler one to save computational resources dur-
ing model inference [25]. He can also use different techniques
(e.g., pruning [30], quantization [26], low precision [20], etc)
to compress customers’ models to save storage. For instance,
the cloud provider can use these techniques to compress a
VGG-16 model for image classification, saving the storage
by 49× with the accuracy degradation of only 0.33% [30].
Therefore, it is very hard for customers to detect if this model
is compromised with only black-box access to the target model.
D. Challenges
Protecting the integrity of DNN models in remote clouds is
a challenging task for customers. First, the adversary has dif-
ferent means to tamper with the models in the complex MLaaS
cloud environment. It is beyond the customers’ capability to
guarantee or check the model integrity after the model leaves
the customers.
Second, once the targeted model is uploaded, the customers
do not have direct access to the model files in the cloud. So
they cannot directly compare the model parameters (or hashes)
with the correct ones and check if they are intact. Even if the
MLaaS has APIs to enable customers to retrieve the models
or their hash values from the cloud side, a dishonest cloud
2Indiscriminate attack, i.e. degrading the accuracy of all samples, can also
be done through data poisoning. However, such modification can be trivially
detected by taking normal samples as inputs and examining the outputs.
Therefore, we do not explicitly discuss the indiscriminate attack in the paper.
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provider can give customers the original models, cheating them
that their models are correct, when a compromised model is
actually served.
Third, it is possible that the customer exhaustedly sends
inputs to the cloud, retrieves the label and compares it with
the reference outputs. Ghodsi et al. [25] used such a method
to verify if an untrusted cloud provider cheats the customer
by serving a simpler and less accurate model. But it is very
inefficient to detect the attacks in Sec. III-C, because the
attacker explores the minimal influence on “non-target” inputs
to avoid being detected in these attacks. Ideally, a trojaned
model gives the wrong prediction only when the input contains
the trigger. Since the triggers are unknown to the customer, the
customer has no means to produce a sample, whose outputs
from the correct model and trojaned model are distinguishable.
For targeted data poisoning attacks, the target set is unknown
to the customer. For storage saving attacks, model compression
does hardly affect the model output results, so the output of
normal samples cannot reflect the model integrity.
IV. SENSITIVE-SAMPLE FINGERPRINTING
A. Overview of Our Methodology
As described in Sec. III, we consider the attack scenario in
which the customer uploads a machine learning model fθ to
the cloud provider for model serving. However, an adversary
may compromise the model and change it to fθ′ . The customer
wants to verify if the model served by the cloud provider is
actually the one he uploaded. The model served by the cloud
provider is a black-box to the customer, i.e. the customer does
not have direct access to the model files in the cloud. He
can only use the online model for prediction: when he sends
an input to the cloud provider, the cloud provider returns the
corresponding output.
To deal with the online black-box scenario, our main
idea is that, we can generate a small set of transformed
inputs {vi}ni=1, whose outputs predicted by the compro-
mised model will be different from the outputs predicted
by the original intact model. We call such transformed
inputs Sensitive-Samples. We use a small set of these
transformed inputs and their corresponding correct model
outputs as the fingerprint of the DNN model, i.e. FG =
{(vi, fθ(vi))}ni=1.
To verify the integrity of a model, the customer first uses
the correct model locally to generate Sensitive-Samples
and obtain the corresponding correct output y = fθ(v). Then
he simply sends these samples to the cloud provider and
obtains the output y′ = fθ′(v). By comparing y and y
′, the
customer can check if the model is intact or changed.
There are some challenges in designing a good fingerprint,
especially a good input transform, for integrity checking. We
define a qualified fingerprint as one satisfying the following
characteristics:
• Sensitive to model changes. In order to detect the model
integrity breach, the fingerprint must be sensitive to the
modification of model parameters. In some attacks, the
adversary changes a small number of parameters, e.g.
selective neuron modification to inject trojans or backdoors
[37]. We must carefully design the input transform so
that they are able to capture model changes made by real
attacks.
• Generalizable. The fingerprint generation algorithm should
be independent of the machine learning models and the
training datasets. The same method should be generalizable
to different models and datasets.
• Hard to be spotted. The fingerprint cannot be a random
or weird input. Otherwise, the adversary can easily notice
the unusual usage. Instead, the generated fingerprint should
look similar to natural inputs so the adversary cannot
recognize if it is used for integrity checking, or for normal
model serving.
• Easy to verify. The integrity checking algorithm must be as
simple as possible, in order to reduce the cost and overhead
for the verification.
To achieve the above requirements, we convert the gen-
eration of Sensitive-Samples to an optimization problem: the
transformed inputs must make the model outputs the most
sensitive to the parameters under such inputs. So even when
a small portion of the model parameters are changed (as in
the backdoor or trojan attacks), the corresponding outputs of
these samples change with the highest probability. We generate
the Sensitive-Samples from common inputs so they
are quite similar to the common ones and can hardly be
spotted by the adversary. The Sensitive-Samples can
detect the integrity breaches while the common inputs cannot.
Below we first formally define the problem of generating
Sensitive-Samples in Section IV-B. Then we detail
the algorithm of generating samples in Section IV-C, and
fingerprints in Section IV-D. We discuss the effects of model
output specification on the sample generation in Section IV-E.
B. Integrity Verification Goal
A DNN model can be defined as a function y = fθ(x).
Here θ is the set of all parameters in the model. We rewrite
the model function as y = f(W,x) = [y1, ..., yr]
T =
[f1(W,x), ..., fr(W,x)]
T . Here W = [w1, w2, ..., ws] is a
subset of parameters-of-interest in θ in our consideration,
containing the weights and biases.
We assume W in the correct model is modified by ∆w, i.e.
W ′ = W + ∆w. The corresponding outputs of the correct and
compromised model become y = f(W,x) and y′ = f(W +
∆w, x), respectively. In order to precisely detect this change
through y and y′, the “sensitive” input v should maximize the
difference between y and y′. Formally, this means:
v = argmaxx ||f(W + ∆w, x)− f(W,x)||2
= argmaxx ||f(W + ∆w, x)− f(W,x)||22
= argmaxx Σ
r
i=1||fi(W + ∆w, x)− fi(W,x)||22
(3)
where || · ||2 denotes the l2 norm of a vector. Note that we do
not have prior-knowledge on ∆w (how the adversary modifies
the model) in advance. With Taylor Expansion we have:
fi(W + ∆w, x) = fi(W,x) +
∂fi(W,x)
∂W
T
∆w +O(||∆w||22)
(4)
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Consider ∆w as a perturbation of W , we approximate Eq
(4) to the first-order term:
||fi(W + ∆w, x)− fi(W,x)||22 ≈ ||
∂fi(W,x)
∂W
T
∆w||22 (5)
∝ ||∂fi(W,X)
∂W
||22 (6)
Note that the left-hand side of Eq (5) models the difference
of output yi between a correct DNN and a compromised DNN.
In Eq (6) we conclude that the l2 norm of the gradient
||∂fi(W,x)∂W ||2 can model the element-wise “sensitivity” of the
DNN output corresponding to the parameters. Therefore, the
sensitivity S of f(W,x) can be defined as:
S = Σri=1||
∂fi(W,x)
∂W
||22
=
∥∥∥∥∂f(W,x)∂W
∥∥∥∥2
F
(7)
where || · ||F is the Frobenius norm [7] of a matrix.
We would like to look for the optimal input v to maximize
the sensitivity S through the following optimization problem:
v = argmax
x
∥∥∥∥∂f(W,x)∂W
∥∥∥∥2
F
(8)
A Sensitive-Sample of the model is the transformed
input and the corresponding output, i.e. (v, y = f(W, v)).
C. Sensitive Sample Generation
Generating sensitive samples is an optimization problem.
We introduce some constraints on the samples.
Sample Correctness. In some cases, there are some re-
quirements for the range of sample data, denoted as [p, q].
For instance, in the case of image-based applications, the
intensities of all pixels must be in the range of [0, 255] for a
valid image input.
Small Perturbation. In Section IV-A, we described a
sensitive-sample should look like a normal input, to
prevent the adversary from evading the integrity checking. So
we add one more constraint: the generated sample is a small
perturbation of a natural data v0 sampled from original data
distribution DX , i.e. the difference of the generated sample
and v0 should not exceed a small threshold .
Eqs (9) summarize the objective and constraints of this
optimization problem. The constraint set [p, q]m is a convex
set, therefore we can use Projected Gradient Ascent [8] to
generate v.
v = argmax
x
∥∥∥∥∂f(W,x)∂W
∥∥∥∥2
F
s.t. x ∈ [p, q]m
‖x− v0‖ ≤ 
(9)
We show our proposed Sensitive-Sample generation
algorithm in Algorithm 1. Lines 9-10 initialize the input, i.e.
a sample from the natural data distribution DX . Line 12 sets
up the element-wise loss function ||∂fi(W,x)∂W ||22. Line 13 sets
up the sample correctness constraints. Line 14 loops while v
is still similar to the original initialization v0. itr max is set
to avoid an infinite loops. Lines 15-19 apply a gradient ascent
on the sensitivity, a.k.a. S in Eq (7). Line 20 projects v onto
the sample correctness constraint set. It is a truncation of the
values to the range of [p,q], which is [0,255] for image pixels.
Algorithm 1 Generating a Sensitive-Sample
1: Function Sensitive-Sample-Gen(f , W , itr max, , lr)
2:
3: /* f: the target model */
4: /* W: parameters in consideration */
5: /* itr max: maximum number of iterations */
6: /* : threshold for small perturbation constraints */
7: /* lr: learning rate in projected gradient ascent */
8:
9: v0= Init Sample()
10: v = v0
11: i = 0
12: lk =
∥∥∥∂fk(W,v)∂W |∥∥∥2
2
, k = 1, 2...NOutput
13: Constraint Set = [p, q]m
14: while ((|v − v0| ≤ ) && (i < itr max)) do
15: ∆ = 0
16: for (k = 0; k < NOutput; k + +) do
17: ∆+ = ∂lk/∂v
18: end for
19: v = v + lr ∗∆
20: v=Projection(v, Constraint Set)
21: i+ +
22: end while
23: return {v, f(W, v)}
D. Fingerprint Generation: Maximum Active-Neuron Cover
(MANC) Sample Selection
In some cases, one Sensitive-Sample may not be
enough to detect all possible model changes. The main reason
is, we observe that if a neuron is inactive3 given an input
sample, the sensitivity of all weights connected to that neuron
becomes zeros, i.e. the small modification of such weights will
not be reflected in the outputs.
Layer L-1
Neuron uiL-1
Layer L
u3L
Wi3
Activation Wi2
Wi1
α
u2L
u1L
Fig. 3: Backward propagation of DNN. Inactive neuron
uL−1i zeros the sensitivity of weights connected to it
(Wi1,Wi2,Wi3).
Figure 3 illustrates this scenario. Suppose the activation
function of layer L − 1 is ReLU4, and the activation α of a
3The neuron’s output after the activation function is 0 or very close to 0.
4If the activation function is sigmoid, a neuron is inactive if α is very
close to 0.
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neuron uL−1i in the previous layer L−1 is 0 (inactive). Based
on the chain-rule of backward propagation, we have:
∂f
∂wi1
=
∂f
∂uL1
∂uL1
∂wi1
=
∂f
∂uL1
α
= 0
(10)
Thus by Taylor Expansion we have:
f(wi1 + ∆wi1, x) = f(wi1, x) +
∂f
∂wLi1
∆wi1 +O(||wi1||22)
≈ f(wi1, x) + 0 ∗∆wi1
= f(wi1, x)
(11)
From Eq (11) we conclude that a small perturbation of
wi1 will not be reflected in the output if α = 0. The same
derivation also holds for wi2 and wi3.
To address this problem, we propose our Maximum Ac-
tive Neuron Cover (MANC) Sample Selection algorithm to
select a small number of samples from a bag of generated
Sensitive-Samples to avoid the inactive neurons. Our
criterion is to minimize the number of neurons not being
activated by any Sensitive-Samples, or equivalently,
maximize the number of neurons being activated at least once
by the selected samples. We call the resultant set of Sensitive-
Samples with their correct model outputs, the fingerprint of
the DNN model.
We can abstract it to a maximum coverage prob-
lem [9]. As input, we are given a bag of generated
Sensitive-Samples B = {S1, ..., SN} and k, the number
of desired samples. Suppose each Sensitive-Sample Si
activates a set of neurons Pi. The set {Pi} may have elements
(neurons) in common. We will select k of these sets such that
the maximum number of elements (neurons) are covered, i.e.
the union of the selected sets has maximal size. We define the
set of neurons being activated at least once by the k samples
as Active-Neuron Cover (ANC). It is the union of individually
activated neurons Pi, i.e.
⋃k
i=1 Pk. We would like to maximize
the number of elements (neurons) in ANC, i.e. maximize
|⋃ki=1 Pk|.
The generalized maximum coverage problem is known to
be NP-hard [22], thus we use a greedy search to handle it.
Intuitively, in each iteration t, we choose a set Pt which
contains the largest number of uncovered neurons. We show
the pseudo-code of MANC algorithm in Algorithm 2. We show
an illustration of one step in the MANC algorithm in Figure
4.
Line 7 in Algorithm 2 initializes the uncovered neurons to
all neurons of interest. Line 8 initializes the set of the selected
sample to null. Line 12 computes the activations of neurons
with corresponding input Sensitive-Sample B[i]. Line
13 determines the neurons that are activated by B[i], i.e. Pi.
Line 17 loops to select one sample in each iteration. Lines
Algorithm 2 Maximum Active Neuron Cover(MANC) Sample
Selection
1: Function MANC(Neurons, B, k)
2:
3: /* Neurons: The neurons of interest */
4: /* B: The bag of samples from Algorithm 1 */
5: /* k: Number of desired samples */
6:
7: Uncovered = Neurons
8: Sample List = []
9:
10: /* Each sample B[i] activates neurons Pi */
11: for (i = 0; i < |B|; i+ +) do
12: α = Activation(Neurons, B[i])
13: Pi = α > 0
14: end for
15:
16: /* Outer loop selects one sample each time */
17: for (i = 0; i < k; i+ +) do
18:
19: /* Inner loop among all samples to find the one that
activates the largest number of uncovered neurons */
20: for (j = 0; j < |B|; j + +) do
21: NewCoveredj = Uncovered
⋂
Pj
22: Nj = | NewCoveredj |
23: end for
24: l = argmaxj Nj
25: Sample List.add(B[l])
26: Uncovered = Uncovered - Pl
27: end for
28: return Sample List
20-25 determine which sample activates the largest number of
uncovered neurons, and add it to the selected sample set. Line
26 updates the uncovered neurons.
E. Model Output Specification
The form of the model output significantly affects the
information that can be retrieved through black-box access.
We consider three forms of y as the outputs of a DNN for
classification tasks:
• Case 1: Numerical probabilities of each class.
• Case 2: Top-k (k>1) classification labels.
• Case 3: Top-1 classification label.
In general, the less information included in the output
(from Case 1 (most) to Case 3 (least)), the harder to generate
valid Sensitive-Samples and fingerprints. However, in
our experiments, we observe that our proposed algorithm can
detect an integrity breach for all known real attacks if only the
top-1 label is provided (case 3) with high accuracy (>99.5%,
<10 samples). Our experiments also show that we need even
fewer samples (<3 samples) if more information is provided
(cases 1 and 2). We discuss these results in detail in Section
VI.
F. Adversarial Examples and Sensitive-Samples
A similar and popular concept of our proposed
Sensitive-Samples is adversarial examples [61]: the
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Covered=8
New Covered=4
New Covered=8
New Covered=3
Select !
(a)
(b)
(c)
Active neurons of each new sample Pi
Neurons already covered
Neurons uncovered
Fig. 4: Illustration of selecting one sample in Algorithm 2
(line 17-27). Suppose the set Sample List initially contains
one selected sample (young lady, left). We want to select the
next sample from three candidates (a),(b) and (c). We compute
the neurons (red) that have been activated by the samples
already in S, i.e. Active-Neuron Cover, and the uncovered
neurons (white). We also compute the neurons activated by
each candidate (Pi). Candidate samples (a),(b) and (c) activate
4,8 and 3 uncovered neurons, respectively. Thus we add the
candidate (b) to Sample List and update the covered neurons.
adversary intentionally adds human unnoticeable permutation
∆x to the normal samples x, so the model gives a wrong
prediction for this sample, i.e., fθ(x + ∆x) 6= fθ(x). The
adversarial examples are commonly used in evasion attacks
(Section VIII-B).
In this paper, we introduce Sensitive-Samples, an-
other type of transformed inputs. Sensitive-Samples
also have human unnoticeable permutation from the normal
samples, i.e., z′ = z + ∆z. Instead of making the model give
wrong outputs, the outputs of the Sensitive-Samples
change with the model parameters, i.e., fθ(z
′) 6= fθ+∆θ(z′).
Thus, unlike adversarial examples usually being used as
an evasion attack strategy, Sensitive-Samples can be
use as a powerful approach to defend against model in-
tegrity attack. Table I shows the comparisons between the
Sensitive-Samples and adversarial examples.
TABLE I: Comparisons between Sensitive-Samples and
adversarial examples.
Sensitive-Samples Adversarial-Examples
Similarity Transformed inputs
Purpose Defense Attack
Settings
Model parameters change
fθ(z
′
) 6= fθ+∆θ(z′)
Input perturbation
fθ(x+ ∆x) 6= fθ(x)
Generation White-box White/Black box
Usage Black-box Black-box
Optimization Maximize the sensitivity
Maximize the cost function?Goal of output w.r.t model parameters
? There exists other approaches to generate adversarial examples.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Attack Coverage
Our proposed method is generic and able to detect integrity
breaches due to various attacks against DNN models. We
evaluate this method on four categories of attacks, based on
the attack goal and techniques of compromising models. These
cover from very subtle model changes to significant changes.
Neural network trojan attack. The attack goal is to inject
trojan into the model so it will mis-classify the samples
containing a specific trigger [37], [29]. To achieve this, given a
pretrained DNN model, the adversary carefully selects one or
some “critical” neurons which the outputs are highly dependent
on. Then he reverses the training data from the model, and adds
triggers to them. He modifies the weights on the path from the
selected neurons to the last layer by retraining the model using
the data with triggers.
Targeted poisoning attack. The attack goal is to force the
model to mis-classify a target class. The adversary achieves
this by poisoning the dataset with carefully-crafted malicious
samples. We consider two types of such attacks: the first one
is error-generic poisoning attack [14], [43], [63], in which
the outputs of the compromised model for the target class
can be arbitrary. The second one is error-specific poisoning
attack [47]: the adversary modifies the model to mis-classify
the target class as a fixed class that he desires.
Model compression attack. The attack goal is to compress
the DNN model without affecting the model accuracy signif-
icantly, to save cloud storage for profit. There are different
compression techniques to achieve this, e.g., pruning [30],
quantization [26], low precision [20]. In our experiments, we
detect the model compression by the low precision technique.
Other compression techniques can be detected similarly.
Arbitrary weights modification. We consider the most gen-
eral scenario: the adversary can change the weights of any
arbitrary neurons to arbitrary values. The goal is to investigate
the capability of our approach in defending against general
model integrity breaches.
B. Datasets and Models
We evaluate our solution on attacks against different tasks
and DNN models to show its effectiveness and generality. For
most of the integrity attacks, we use the same datasets and
models as in the literature. In Table II, we list the model
specifications, as well as the attack results.
Original model accuracy denotes the classification accu-
racy of the original correct model. Attack goal shows the
adversary’s target of modifying the model. Attack technique
indicates how the adversary modifies the model. Note that
we do not make any specific assumption on attack technique,
providing comprehensive protection against all types of model
modification. Attack result shows the mis-classification rate for
neural network trojan attack and accuracy degradation attack,
and the compression rate for model compression attack.
C. Hyper-parameters and Configurations
In our experiments, we set the learning rate to 1*10−3. We
choose ADAM as our optimizer. We set itr Max to 1000.
We consider all the weights in the last layer as parameters-of-
interest W . This is because the last layer must be modified
in all existing attacks, and the output is most sensitive to
this layer. We also observe that setting a threshold  to the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR), i.e. ||v−v0||||v0|| , is generally better
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TABLE II: Datasets and models in our evaluation.
Dataset Task Model # layers # Conv # FC Original Attack Attack Attacklayers layers accuracy goal technique result
Neural network VGG-Face Face VGG-16 16 13 3 74.8% Misclassify inputs Selective neural 100%trojan attack recognition with triggers retraining
Error-generic GTSRB Traffic sign CNN 7 6 1 95.6% Misclassify “Stop” Data 98.6%Targeted recognition traffic sign poisoning
poisoning Error-specific GTSRB Traffic sign CNN 7 6 1 95.6% Misclassify “Stop” Data 87.3%recognition to “Speed 100km” poisoning
Model compression CIFAR-10 Image CNN 7 6 1 87.6% Save storage Precision 4x compressionclassification reduction 84.1%
Arbitrary weights AT&T Face MLP 1 0 1 95.0% General model Arbitrary ?modification recognition modification modification
? We evaluate it for general integrity, thus no attack success rate.
than using l2-norm (||v− v0||). This is because the SNR both
considers the perturbation and relative data intensity.
We reproduce the above four categories of DNN integrity
attacks, and implement our solution using Tensorflow 1.4.1.
We run our experiments on a server with 1 Nvidia 1080Ti
GPU, 2 Intel Xeon E5-2667 CPUs, 32MB cache, 64GB
memory and 2TB hard-disk.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Neural Network Trojan Attack
We evaluate the DNN trojan inserted through selective
neurons modification [37] on the VGG-Face model and dataset.
VGG-Face is a standard deep learning model used in face
recognition tasks.
Generation Mechanism. Figure 5 shows the trade-
off between the sensitivity and SNR during the
Sensitive-Samples generation process. The blue
line represents the sensitivity, i.e. defined in Eq (7) as
||∂f(W,x)∂W ||2F . The orange line represents the SNR. At the
beginning of the optimization, the SNR is high, reflecting that
the generated image is similar to the original input. However,
the sensitivity is low, showing that the DNN output is not
sensitive to the weight changes. It also indicates that directly
using original images as fingerprints is not good. As the
optimization goes on, the sensitivity increases significantly
and finally converges to a high value. Meanwhile, artifacts are
introduced in the sample generation, decreasing the similarity
(SNR). We also show four intermediate images to show the
trend of Sensitive-Sample generation in Figure 5.
In Figure 7, we show representative examples of the
sensitive-samples. The generated images are very sim-
ilar to the original inputs, with mild artifacts on the faces.
Therefore, the attacker can hardly determine whether it is a
natural image or a testing image for integrity checking.
Active-Neuron Cover. We show a real example of the Active
Neuron Cover (ANC) obtained from MANC in protecting
the VGG-Face model in Figure 6. We represent ten selected
Sensitive-Samples in the top and bottom rows. The correspond-
ing individual active-neurons Pi are marked white in the two
intermediate rows. The middle row shows the final ANC of the
selected Sensitive-Samples. In this example, 3296/4096=80.5%
neurons are activated.
Detection Accuracy. We define a successful detection as
“given NS sensitive samples, there is at least one sample,
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Fig. 5: Sensitivity and Signal-Noise Ratio (SNR) in the
Sensitive-Sample generation process. As the optimization pro-
cess goes on, the sensitivity of the generated image increases,
while the SNR of the generated image decreases.
Selected
Sensitive-
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Selected
Sensitive-
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active neurons 
(white)
Total 3298/4096 
neurons active
Corresponding 
active neurons 
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Fig. 6: An example of Active Neuron Cover (ANC)
whose top-1 label predicted by the compromised model is
different from the top-1 label predicted by the correct model”.
Note that this is the most challenging case discussed in Section
IV-E. We show the detection rate of (1) Sensitive-Samples
with MANC sample selection (blue), (2) Sensitive-Samples
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(a) Original Images
(b) Generated Sensitive-Samples
Fig. 7: Original and generated Sensitive-Sample images for
integrity checking (Face Recognition)
with random selection (orange) and (3) Non-Sensitive Samples
(green) in Figure 8. In case (1) and (2), we first generate a
bag of 100 sensitive-samples and select NS of them using
MANC and random selection, respectively. In case (3), we
randomly select NS images from the original validation set.
We repeat the experiment 10,000 times and report the average
detection rate. We observe that Sensitive-Samples + MANC
always achieves a higher detection rate than Sensitive-Samples
+ random selection. Sensitive-Samples based approaches are
always much better than non-sensitive samples, regardless of
NS . Sensitive-Samples + MANC reaches 99.8% and 100%
detection rate at NS = 2, 3 respectively. It indicates that we
only need very few sensitive-samples (<4) to detect
the model integrity breach.
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Fig. 8: Detection rate corresponds to the number of samples
NS on VGG-Face. High detection rate (>99.8%) is achieved
with only 2 MANC selected Sensitive-Samples.
Output Specification. We list the detection rates correspond-
ing to different output specifications (columns) and NS (rows)
in Table III. “top-k” means the model outputs the k top
labels. “p-dec-n” means the model outputs probabilities in
addition to labels, with n numbers after the decimal point.
For example, “Top-1-p-dec-2” means the model outputs top-1
probability with the precision of 2 numbers after the decimal
point. Comparing the first 3 columns, a larger k provides
higher detection rates because more information is embedded
in the output. Comparing columns 1 and 4, the additional
information of class probabilities helps increase the detection
rate. Comparing the last two columns, the higher precision of
the per-class probability also increases the detection rate.
TABLE III: Detection rates (%) w.r.t to the output specifica-
tions. Large k, probability information and high precision of
the probabilities can increase the trojan detection rate.
# of samples top-1 top-3 top-5 top-1-p-dec2 p-dec-1 p-dec-2
1 94.1 100.0 100.0 99.6 99.8 100.0
2 99.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
False Positives. Our proposed Sensitive-Samples defense
leverages the determinacy of DNN model inference, therefore
no false positive is raised. It is also true for all the models and
datasets we evaluate below. We claim this is another advantage
of our solution.
B. Targeted Poisoning Attack
We evaluate our proposed method on detecting model
changes through targeted poisoning attacks. We consider two
attack scenarios. (1) Error-generic attack: the attacker’s goal
is to maximize the degradation of the prediction accuracy of
the target class. The attacker does not care about the resultant
output, as long as it is incorrect. (2) Error-generic attack: the
attacker’s goal is to mis-classify the samples from the target
class to a specific class that he desires.
1) Error-generic attack.
We evaluate the targeted error-generic attack on a security-
critical application, the traffic sign recognition system used
in autonomous-driving cars. The target model is a 7-layer
CNN model trained over the German Traffic Sign Recognition
Benchmark (GTSRB) database, which can recognize more
than 40 classes of traffic signs. The attacker slightly modifies
the model through data poisoning, in order to degrade the
classification accuracy of “STOP” sign, while the recognition
accuracy of all other traffic signs remains the same.
Generation Mechanism. We use Sensitive-Sample finger-
printing to verify if the traffic sign recognition is unchanged.
Figure 9 shows some examples on the GTSRB dataset. Orig-
inal images are presented in Figure 9a. The corresponding
generated images are presented in Figure 9b.
(a) Original Images
(b) Generated Sensitive-Samples
Fig. 9: Original and generated Sensitive-Samples for integrity
protection (GTSRB Traffic Sign)
Detection Accuracy. We show the detection rate of Sensitive-
Samples + MANC (dotted blue), Sensitive-Samples + random
selection (dotted orange) and Non-Sensitive Samples (dotted
green) in Figure 10. The detection rate increases with more
samples. MANC improves the detection rate by 15% when
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NS = 1, and 7% when NS = 2. When NS = 2, Sensitive-
Samples + MANC achieves the detection rate 100%. Sensitive-
Samples + random selection achieves 92.9% and Non-Sensitive
Samples only gets 10.6%. When NS > 5, both Sensitive-
Samples + MANC and Sensitive-Samples + random selection
achieve 100% accuracy. However, non-sensitive samples de-
tect only 41.6% model changes. This comparison shows the
effectiveness of our approach.
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Fig. 10: Detection rate w.r.t the number of samples on
the GTSRB dataset. Dotted lines represent error-generic at-
tack. Solid lines represent error-specific attack. Sensitive-
Samples+MANC (blue) achieves significantly higher detection
rate than non-sensitive sample (green).
Output Specification. We show the detection rate corre-
sponding to the output specifications in Table IV. Comparing
columns 1,2 and 3, we conclude that the larger k provides
more information and helps achieve higher detection rate.
Probabilities provide extra information and also increase the
detection rate, by comparing columns 1 and 5. However, this
improvement (1.1%) is not as significant as in the previous
VGG-Face recognition dataset (5%), because most of the
probabilities are small and all rounded to 0.0, thus removing
(rather than adding) information, compared to columns 2 and 3.
For the same reason, outputting the probabilities of all classes
with 2 digits (p-dec-2) after the decimal point does not improve
the detection rate, compared to 1 digits (p-dec-1).
TABLE IV: Detection rates (%) w.r.t to the output forms on
GTSRB Traffic Sign dataset. In an error-generic attack, the
“STOP” signs are mis-classified as a random wrong class.
Large k, probability information and high precision of the
probabilities help with the model modification detection.
# of samples top-1 top-3 top-5 top-1-p-dec2 p-dec-1 p-dec-2
1 87.68 100.0 100.0 88.76 88.76 88.76
2 99.97 100.0 100.0 99.87 99.98 100.0
3 99.99 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.99 100.0
5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
10 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2) Error-specific Attack
We also use the same CNN model and GTSRB database
for evaluating the error-specific attack. The attacker adopts
the data poisoning technique to modify the model, so the
compromised model will mis-classify the “STOP” sign as
TABLE V: Detection rates (%) w.r.t to the output forms on
GTSRB Traffic Sign dataset. In an error-specific attack, the
“STOP” signs are mis-classified as “Speed limit 100 km/h”.
Large k, probability information and high precision of the
probabilities help with the model modification detection.
# of samples top-1 top-3 top-5 top-1-p-dec2 p-dec-1 p-dec-2
1 97.90 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2 99.97 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
10 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
“Speed limit 100km/h”, while giving correct results for other
traffic signs.
Detection Accuracy. We show the detection rate of Sensitive-
Samples + MANC (solid blue), Sensitive-Samples + random
selection (solid orange) and Non-Sensitive Samples (solid
green) in Figure 10. We observe that the detection rates are
higher than the error-generic attack, regardless of approaches
and NS . We can detect 97.9% model modification with a sin-
gle Sensitive-Sample. On the contrary, a non-sensitive
sample only detects < 5.0% model changes.
Output Specification. We show the detection rate correspond-
ing to the output specifications in Table V. Comparing columns
1,2 and 3, we conclude that the larger k provides more infor-
mation and helps achieve higher detection rate. We observe
that the detection rate of error-specific attack is higher than
error-generic attack using the same output specification. We
also observe that, a single Sensitive-Sample can detect
error-specific attack with 100% accuracy if extra information,
e.g. top-1 probabilities, top-k (k> 1) classes and probabilities
of all classes, is provided.
C. Model Compression Attack
Next we evaluate the detection of model integrity breach
due to model compression. The target model is a CNN trained
on CIFAR-10 dataset. To compress the model, the attacker
stores the model with low precision, i.e., the parameters are
converted from 32 bits to 8 bits. The model size is thus reduced
by 4x, while the accuracy is reduced only by 3.6%.
Generation Mechanism. In Figure 11, we show the gener-
ated sensitive-samples. We observe that the generated
samples look similar to the original ones.
(a) Original Images
(b) Generated Sensitive-Samples
Fig. 11: Original and generated Sensitive-Samples for integrity
protection (CIFAR)
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Detection Accuracy. We show the model compression de-
tection rate of Sensitive-Samples + MANC (blue), Sensitive-
Samples + random selection (orange) and Non-Sensitive Sam-
ples in Figure 12. The detection rate achieves 99.5% when
NS = 6 and ultimately >99.9% when NS = 10. We observe
that, our proposed Sensitive-Samples + MANC approach al-
ways outperforms other approaches, regardless of NS .
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 2 4 6 8 10
D
et
ec
tio
n 
R
at
e
Number of Samples NS
Sensitive-Samples + MANC
Sensitive-Samples + Random Selection
Non-Sensitive-Samples
Fig. 12: Detection rate of model compression corresponds to
the number of samples on CIFAR-10 dataset.
Output Specification. Table VI shows the effect of output
specification on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We observe that the
detection rates of all output specifications increase as the num-
ber of Sensitive-Samples increases. The detection rate of model
compression with probability outputs (last 3 columns in Table
VI) are lower than the corresponding results in the previous
model modifications (last 3 columns in Table III). It is because
the numerical precision of decimal numbers are reduced when
the model is compressed, resulting in two probabilities with
small difference become indistinguishable. We also find that
the detection rate when the model outputs top-1 probability
with 2 decimal digits is lower than outputting top-1 index,
when NS ≤ 5. This is because the model is compressed such
that most of the top-1 probabilities are rounded to 100%. One
Sensitive-Sample achieves 100% detection rate if the model
outputs top-3 or top-5 indexes. In all other cases, 6 samples
are enough to achieve >99.5% detection rate.
TABLE VI: Detection rates (%) w.r.t to the output forms on
CIFAR-10 dataset. Large k, probability information and high
precision of the probabilities help with the trojan detection.
# of samples top-1 top-3 top-5 top-1-p-dec2 p-dec-1 p-dec-2
1 50.29 100.0 100.0 49.79 54.07 71.21
2 84.68 100.0 100.0 69.92 89.13 94.45
3 95.23 100.0 100.0 87.94 97.71 99.25
5 99.14 100.0 100.0 98.92 99.78 99.99
8 99.87 100.0 100.0 99.98 100.0 100.0
10 99.96 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
D. Arbitrary Weights Modification
In addition to specific model integrity attacks, we discuss
the feasibility of our proposed defense against any arbitrary
DNN integrity breaches. The adversary can arbitrarily modify
a subset of the weights. We would like to investigate how the
detection rate changes w.r.t the ratio of changed weights.
To simulate this attack, we select a ratio r (0.1%-80%)
and randomly modify r weights, by adding Gaussian noise
with zero mean and unit standard deviation. Note that most
model integrity attacks need to modify all weights. Other attack
techniques, e.g., DNN trojan via neuron selection, at least have
to modify the fully connected layers, which changes more
weights than we evaluate in this section.
To eliminate the effect of the unbalanced importance of
weights on different layers, we choose a single-layer percep-
tron as our evaluated model. The weights on the same layer
contribute nearly the same in a model. We evaluate the model
on the AT&T face recognition dataset. There are 40 distinct
classes in the dataset.
Generation Mechanism. We show the generated Sensitive-
Samples in Figure 13. Few artifacts are introduced in the
samples. However, the brightness of the generated samples is
enhanced. We find this is because many pixels are truncated to
the maximum intensity, i.e. 255, in the constraint set projection
step in Algorithm 1. On the other hand, these generated images
are still very similar to the natural ones.
(a) Original Images
(b) Generated Sensitive-Samples
Fig. 13: Generated Sensitive-Samples for AT&T dataset.
Detection Accuracy. The resultant detection rates versus r are
presented in Figure 14. Clearly, the detection rate increases as r
increases. The detection rate also increases as more Sensitive-
Samples are leveraged. When r=1%, i.e one order smaller than
the number of changed weights in real attacks, our proposed
method detects >95% of the integrity breaches.
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Fig. 14: Detection rate w.r.t the ratio of weights changed.
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VII. DISCUSSION
A. Alternative Image Transforms
In Section VI, we compare the effectiveness of our pro-
posed Sensitive-Samples with randomly selected nor-
mal samples. Here we discuss some alternative transforms for
DNN integrity verification. We apply some transforms on the
input samples to generate fingerprints of the DNN models. We
consider ¬ adding random noise, ­ rotating the image and ®
distorting the image.
We use VGG-Face dataset as an example. Figure 15 shows
the original sample, Sensitive-Sample, and samples with
noise, rotation and distortion operations. We observe that the
Sensitive-Sample is the most similar one to the original
image, thus imperceptible to the adversaries.
We show the detection rate of different transforms in Fig-
ure 16. Our proposed Sensitive-Sample fingerprinting
(uppermost solid blue line) achieves the highest detection rate,
regardless of NS . The image transforms in our consideration
have higher detection rates than the original images, but not as
high as our proposed solution. Considering Figures 15 and 16,
Sensitive-Samples are the optimal solution for model
integrity verification.
Fig. 15: Benchmarks from left to right: The original image,
Sensitive-Sample (Proposed), noised image, rotated image and
distorted image.
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Fig. 16: Detection rate comparison among Sensitive-Samples
and image noising, rotation and distortion. Our proposed
Sensitive-Sample fingerprinting (uppermost solid blue line)
achieves the highest detection rate, regardless of NS .
B. Defense Scope and Limitation
Our proposed defense is designed for verifying the integrity
of DNN models in remote clouds. We do not consider the
integrity of DNN executions by the cloud provider. Thus
defeating an adversary who compromises the execution path
of DNN applications is out of our scope. There are several
reasons for our defense scope. First, a lot of generic methods
and systems have been proposed to protect the integrity of
code execution in clouds, and these work can be applied to the
deep learning inference applications. For instance, Intel SGX
secure enclave is proposed to protect the executions of critical
applications [41] and it provides the attestation mechanism
to check the security status of applications at runtime [11].
Different approaches were designed to protect the integrity
of the cloud servers [40], [12], [62], or cloud management
services [59], [58], [60]. Instead, protecting the model integrity
is more challenging as the adversary can tamper with the model
in different ways, even before the model is transmitted to
the cloud side. Second, we have described that the adversary
has a variety of techniques to compromise the model without
being noticed by the customer (Section III). These subtle attack
techniques are unique to deep learning. So it is necessary to
design a method to protect the model integrity by the customer
in the context of MLaaS. Future work includes developing
methodology to verify the integrity of model inference in
machine learning cloud services.
One limitation of our proposed approach is that it can-
not distinguish between malicious model changes and be-
nign model update. Therefore, whenever the customer up-
dates the model in the cloud, he has to re-generate new
Sensitive-Sample fingerprint for integrity verification.
VIII. RELATED WORK
We describe different types of adversarial machine learning
attacks and the corresponding defenses.
A. Backdoors and Trojans
Attacks. Past work introduced different ways to inject tro-
jans/backdoors to compromise the model integrity. Gu et al.
[29] proposed BadNets: the attacker retrains a correct model
with poisoned training data and generates the compromised
model, which predicts the images with the backdoor (a specific
pattern) as an arbitrary category chosen by the attacker. This
paper also showed that the backdoor remains even if the
trojaned model is transfer-learned to a new one. Liu et al.
[37] improved this attack by only selecting a small part of the
weights to change. They also reconstruct the training dataset
from the model so that the adversary does not need the training
dataset to inject the trojan. Chen et al. [19] proposed another
backdoor attacks: the adversary does not need to have access
to the model. He can train the model from scratch with the
poisoned dataset. They evaluated the technique with different
triggers and datasets.
Defenses. To the best of our knowledge, there exists few
work defending against DNN trojans/backdoors attacks. Liu
et al. [38] proposed three defenses: (1) anomaly detection in
training data. This requires the victim to obtain the poisoned
training dataset, which is not realistic; (2) retraining the model
to remove the trojan. Past work has shown that it is extremely
difficult to entirely remove the trojan via model retraining
or transfer learning [29]; (3) preprocessing the input data
to remove the trigger. This method forces the adversary to
use the preprocessing module, which is unrealistic. Liu et
al. [37] proposed a solution to defeat the trojans designed
by themselves: detecting the trojaned model by analyzing the
distribution of mis-labeled data. However, the victim needs
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to feed the model with a large number of samples, making
it inefficient, expensive and easily spotted when the model is
served in the cloud. In contrast, our method only needs <10
testing samples for verification, which can be very fast and
low-cost. Furthermore, our proposed method guarantees zero
false-positives while the previous work does not.
B. Evasion Attacks
Attacks. Szegedy et al. [61] first proposed the concept of
adversarial examples: with imperceptible and human unnotice-
able modifications to the input, the model mis-classifies these
data. Then Goodfellow et al. [28] proposed a fast gradient
sign method to improve the speed of generating adversarial
examples. Papernot et al. [49], [50] demonstrated generating
adversarial examples with only black-box access to the target
model. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [45] designed universal adver-
sarial perturbations, a general perturbation to attack different
images across different model architectures. These evasion
attack techniques have been demonstrated in physical scenarios
[34], [21] and applications, e.g., face recognition [55], speech
recognition [17], [67].
Defenses. Papernot et al. [51] used distillation in the training
to defeat the evasion attacks. Meng and Chen [44] proposed
a framework to defeat blackbox/greybox evasion attacks by
detecting adversarial samples. Xu et al. [65] proposed a method
to reduce the color bit depth or smooth the image to prevent
evasion attack. These methods cannot be applied to DNN
model integrity verification, as the evasion attacks do not
change the parameters of the model itself.
C. Poisoning Attacks
Attacks. An attacker can poison the training data by injecting
carefully designed samples to compromise the model training
process. Different poisoning techniques have been proposed
for different machine learning models, e.g., SVM [13], lasso
regression [64], topic modeling [42], AutoRegressigve models
[10]. Gradient-based poisoning attacks were designed against
deep neural networks [48], [66], [33].
Defenses. Defense solutions have been proposed to defeat
poisoning attacks. The most popular method is to detect and
remove the poisoning data from the dataset by statistical
comparisons [18], [36], [57]. Poisoning attacks compromise
the model and make it misbehave under normal input, thus
degrading the performance of the learning system. In contrast,
the adversary in DNN trojan attacks may only inject a small
number of poisoned data into the training dataset, to make the
model behave abnormally only with targeted inputs.
IX. CONCLUSION
As deep learning cloud services become popular, protecting
the integrity of DNN models becomes urgent and important.
In this paper, we show that the integrity of model weights can
be dynamically verified by just querying the deployed model
with a few transformed inputs and observing their outputs.
Our proposed detection method defines and uses Sensitive-
Samples, which introduces sensitivity of DNN outputs cor-
responding to the weights. Even a small modification of the
model weights can be reflected in the outputs. We introduce
more constraints to ensure the generated sensitive-samples are
similar to the original inputs, in order to avoid being noticed
by the adversary. Our evaluation on different categories of
DNN integrity attacks shows that our detection mechanism can
effectively (>99% detection rate) and efficiently (<10 black-
box accesses) detect DNN integrity breaches.
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